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What difference does it make, and for whom, whether the nonperforming debts of emerging
market borrowers are restructured? This paper begins by positing a set of counterfactual conditions
under which restructuring wouldmatter, and then shows how several ways in which the actual
world of international lending departs from these conditions give both lenders and borrowers ample
reason to care whether nonperforming debts are restructured. One implication of the way in which
debt restructuring matters is that restructuring should not be "too" easy. Further, with a greater
frequency of defaults, some credit flows to emerging market countries would not be extended in the
first place. An important element driving this line of argument is moral hazard, but (unlike in much
of the recent literature of emerging market debt problems) what is central here is not the availability
of credit from the ilvIF or other official lenders but the more fundamental moral hazard inherent in







bfriedman@harvard.eduBorrowers sometimes can't pay what they owe, and most borrowers and lenders know
this. As a result, debt contracts are usually more complicated, and the considerations that
underlie debt arrangements are more subtle, than would be the case if all that matteredwere the
time valueofmoney. Two specific distinctions are of particular importance for this purpose:
Some borrowers don't pay what they owe because they can't, while others canpay but seek not
to. Arid among those borrowers who can't pay what they owe when they owe it, some canpay
later but others can't pay ever. What to do when borrowers don't meet their obligations is
therefore not merely a matter of set principles but also of information, inference and judgment.
Although these basic truths and the practical questions they raise are relevant to all debt
markets, the events of the past few years have especially highlighted their importance in the-2-
context of borrowers in developing economies and in economies in transition from central
planning to reliance on private initiative and incentives"emerging markets," as they are
typically called. From the summer of 1997 until well into 1999, a series of countries, first in Asia
and then in Latin America experienced debt problems severe enough to be widely regarded as
crises, typically in conjunction with currency crises. But even in the setting of economic
development, such problems were by no means new in 1997. There is a long history ofjust this
kind of event. The Asian crisis in 1997 was not the first such major problem but merely the first
since Mexico in 1994-95.
Placing the questions that arise from debtors' actual or potential nonperformance in the
specific setting of emerging markets adds several important dimensions to the basic considerations
that are already present when the borrower and the lender are both resident in a country like, say,
the United States. To begin, when the source of the saving flow that finances the credit is outside
the borrower's country —asis often the case for developing economies, which normally rely
heavily on foreign capital inflows —thenrelative currency values become part of the story. Next,
many emerging market countries lack the legal or other institutional frameworks that provide
standard and well-understood remedies when problems of borrower nonperformance occur in the
industrialized countries. Sometimes the requisite legal institutions exist but enforcement is
problematic. Many emerging market countries similarly lack the auditing and accounting
practices that facilitate monitoring the financial condition of private borrowers in the industrialized
world. Finally, in some emerging market countries the borrowers, although nominally private, are
often de facto extensions of the government. Sometimes the borrower whose ability to perform is
in question is the government itself.-3-
The issue addressed in this paper is what to do when borrowers in emerging markets can't
pay what they owe to foreign lenders. The specific question asked is what difference it makes,
and for whom, whether the debts of nonperforming borrowers are restructured. Although the
presumption here is that the nonperforming debt is owed abroad, the chain from ultimate lender to
ultimate borrower may have several steps, and so the nonperforming debts in question are not
necessarily owed to foreign lenders directly. But for purposes of this discussion, the fact that it is
foreign saving that ultimately stands behind the credit chain is what matters.
In order to pose meaningfblly a question like what difference some action or some process
makes, it is ordinarily necessary to specii "compared to what?" In the case of debt restructuring,
however, specif,ing a clear-cut alternative is problematic. The logically most obvious alternative
to restructuring a nonperforming debt would be an outright declaration that the borrower will not
meet the obligation, now or ever, but such a possibility is of little practical relevance in this
setting. In the private sector a declaration of this kind conceptually means bankruptcy, but the
absence of functioning bankruptcy institutions and procedures is central to the issue inmany
emerging markets. Among governments, outright debt repudiation is rare apart from
revolutionary changes in regime, and even then many postrevolutionary governments carry their
predecessors' unpaid debts for decades and eventually reach a settlement with their creditors.'
A further reflection of this difficulty in speciing an alternative, which is relevant to much
of the argument developed in this paper, is that while the event of default on a debt contract has a
fairly precise technical meaning from a legal standpoint, there is no generally accepted economic
definition of default. One that would make sense for many purposes would be to say that default
consists of any action by a borrower that results in a reduction in the present value of what was-4-
originally promised to the lenders. (Hence repaying the full amount owed but at a later date
would ordinarily constitute default, as would a reduction in the originally stated interest rate or, of
course, forgiveness of any part of the stated debt principal.) But default conceived in this way is
not very helpfhl for this paper's analysis either. The question at issue here is what should be done
when an emerging market borrower fails to perform as a debt agreement requires, and for
practical purposes this situation almost always results in at least some loss of present value to the
lenders, whether the debt is restructured or not. The issue here is not whether borrowers should
deliver more to lenders, but whether formal debt restructuring is a usefbl way to proceed once it is
clear that a borrower will not perform as the original terms of the obligation speci4'.
In practice, therefore, the plausible alternative to debt restructuring is hard to pin down
precisely. In the reality of actual market practice, there is a large continuum between the poles of
formal debt restructuring and formal repudiation. The main conclusion drawn here is that current
market practice is at a wrong point on this continuum. Moreover, although the situation of
borrower nonperformance considered here almost always results in at least some loss of present
value to the lenders, lenders sometimes do but often do not recognize that loss for purposes of
accounting, regulatory requirements, and the like. Part of what is wrong about the position of
current practice on this continuum between restructuring and repudiation is that lenders recognize
such losses too infrequently. In terms of a concept that figures importantly in this analysis, the
"fiction" of no loss of value is too much a part of current market practice.
To state the argument more filly, the chief conclusions of this paper's inquiry into what
difference debt restructuring makes are as follows:-5-
(1) The conventional wisdom that in cases of debt-service difficulties rescheduling and
other forms of restructuring help to keep new money flowing to the borrowers is correct.
(2) That said, however, not all nonperforming debts should be restructured. Some
frequency of "defaults" (to the extent that default can be considered the alternative to
restructuring), arguably greater than that reflected in current practice, is healthy.
(3) With a greater frequency of default, some credit flows to emerging market countries
that would take place in a lower-default-rate regime presumably would not happen. This outcome
too is not necessarily bad. Judged from the perspective of why debt markets exist in the first
place, the highest aim of borrowing and lending arrangements issimply to maximize the
volume of credit flows.
(4) Although maximizing economic output and economic development j a plausible
objective in choosing borrowing and lending arrangements, avoiding lost output and temporarily
interrupted development in every case is not. Real costs consequent on borrowers'
nonperformance, costs that accrue to debtors as well as creditors, serve an economic flrnction too.
The goal of output growth and economic development, construed broadly over time andspace, is
plausibly enhanced when specific borrowers at specific times suffer real costs, just as it is when
specific lenders at specific times sustain losses.
As the discussion throughout the paper makes clear (if it is not apparent already), an
important force driving this argument is the problem of "moral hazard" that arises from the
differing incentives of borrowers and lenders.2 Especially in the context of much of the public
debate that has ensued from the emerging markets debt crisis of the past few years, it is worth
pointing out explicitly that the moral hazard on which the argument here depends arises from the-6-
ordinary conflict of borrowers' and lenders' interests inherent in any debt transaction, rather than
any consequence specifically attributable to the role of the International Monetary Fund or other
official lenders. The actual or potential availability of credit from the IMF or other official
sources may exacerbate the moral hazard problem that already exists, and hence may make
financial problems of the kind many emerging market countries have recently experienced more
likely or, when a problem does occur, more severe. That question is a subject for a different
paper. But it is wrong as a matter of history to think that there were no such crises in the past
before there was an IMF, and it is therefore wrong as a matter of political economy to believe that
simply abolishing the IMF, as some of the institution's recent critics have suggested, would be
sufficient to prevent such crises in the fi.iture.3 The more fundamental moral hazard issue that
constitutes the heart of the analysis here, and the questions that this paper raises about the "no-
loss-of-value fiction," would remain in any case.
Section 1 briefly sets the stage for the paper's main line of argument by positing a set of
patently counterfactual conditions under which it would not matter whether a nonperforming loan
were rescheduled or otherwise restructured. Section 2 shows how several ways in which the
actual world of international lending to emerging market borrowers departs from these
counterfactual conditions give both lenders and borrowers ample reason to care whether
nonperforming debts are restructured. Section 3 shows that one implication of the way in which
restructuring matters is that although restructuring is useful to both lenders and borrowers, it
nonetheless should not be "too" easy. Section 4 shows how this line of reasoning then leads to
the sequence of conclusions stated above: that some nonperforming debts should default, that
some credits should not be extended in the first place, and that under some circumstances debt-7-
arrangements should impose real economic costs on defaulting borrowers as well as on the
holdersofdefaulted debt. While no ready metric exists (and this paper doesn't develop one) for
saying how far current practiceshouldoptimally move in the direction indicated by these
conclusions, asa qualitativematter the warranted direction isclear. Section5 concludes with
brief comments on two fartherissues.
I. A Counterfactual Base for Comparison
Often the logically coherent way to understand why something matters is first to posit
circumstances in which it wouldn't, and then to focus on differences between those circumstances
and actual reality. Four plainly counterfactual assumptions are together sufficient to make both
lenders and borrowers indifferent to whether a nonperforming debt is rescheduled or otherwise
restructured (although certainly not indifferent to whether the loan becomes nonperforming in the
first place, nor to the amount, if any, that the lenders ultimately recover):
(a) MI lending takes the form of marketable securities, which are regularly traded in highly
liquid ("thick") markets. Specific borrowers do not have "relationships" with specific lenders.
(b) All lenders mark their portfolios of such securities to market daily.
(c) Each borrower's obligations are consolidated. There is only one debt security
outstanding against each borrower
(d) Each borrower's debt is a "one-off' transaction —forexample, the financing of a
freestanding, independent project. There is neither the expectation nor the possibility that the
borrower will seek flarther finds in the debt market.-8-
Whathappens under these conditions when a borrower has difficulty in meeting its
obligations? Once information that this has happened, or even merely information suggesting the
possibility that this may happen, reaches the market in whichthe borrower's debt securitiestrade,
current holders of these securities as well as other potential holders will reduce their assessment of
what the securities are worth. In the extreme case that there is no prospect that the borrower will
ever pay anything on its debt, the market value of the securities will fall to that of the underlying
collateral, if any, less any costs of gaining possession of that collateral and liquidating it. In the
further extreme case that the collateral has become either unobtainable or worthless, the market
value of the securities will be zero. Because no lenders have privileged information bearing on
such matters, current holders of the securities have no systematic reason to disagree with other
market participants about their worth. The only question facing each lender is whether to hold or
sell the securities (or buy more) at whatever new, presumably lower, market price emerges.
Further, regardless of whether a lender sells its position in the borrower's securities or not,
the lender will have to take the reduction in value into account on its balance sheet. If the lender
is a bank, or some other financial institution facing regulation similar to that applicable to banks,
the reduced asset value passes through to its equity in a way that bears on the lender's ability to
meet its capital requirements If the lender is a mutual fund, the reduced valuation is directly
reflected in the fund's quoted net asset value. In either case, no action by the lender can avoid or
mitigate these consequences.
The borrower's incentive to meet its obligations is to avoid seizure of its collateral, unless
the present value of the debt service owed is greater than the value of the collateral, in which case
the borrower would prefer to sacrifice the collateral and stop paying altogether. The lenders'-9-
incentive, however, is to receive as much value as possible from the remaining debt obligation
under the new circumstances. From the perspective of an individual lender —thatis, any one
holder of the borrower's debt securities —thepresent value of the borrower's future payments or
the proceeds of seizure and liquidation of the collateral is simply priced into the market value of
the securities. By contrast, the lenders collectively retain an interest in steering the outcome
toward whatever course of action will give them greater value, and therefore in whatever process
enables them best to achieve this end.
But, importantly, under these circumstances lenders do nthavean interest in formal
restructuring of the debt per se. The borrower's difficulty in meeting the obligation has already
resulted in a reduced price of the securities, and each holder of those securities has immediately
taken that reduced value on its balance sheet. Although whoever is empowered to act as agent
for the lenders will presumably try to persuade the borrower to perform to the greatest extent
possible, using the threat of seizing the collateral as its means of compulsion, once the borrower's
future performance or failure to pay is taken as given a formal restructuring would change
nothing. At the same time, the borrower's only incentive in this regard is to prevent seizure of the
collateral. Moreover, because the lenders have no reason to seek a formal restructuring, the
borrower's offering to enter into one would not represent a concession of any value, In short,
restructuring simply would not matter.
2. Why Restrueturin2 Does Matter
None of the four counterfactual conditions listed in Section 1 corresponds to the actual
world in which either sovereign or private emerging market borrowers obtain credit. Focusing on-10-
how each of these stated conditions departs from the "real world" makes clear just why
restructuring a debt once a borrower has failed to meet its commitments, or even in advance of an
actualevent ofnonperformance, can be important and normally is.
TheRole of Banks. Although the bond marketnowplaysa far greater role in funneling
credit to emerging marketcountriesthan was the case not long ago (though perhaps not any more
so than before World War I), it remains true that much of the debt of both public and private
borrowers in these countries takes the form of bank loans. Moreover, most borrowers have
traditionally attached high priority to staying current on their security obligations. (Among
sovereign borrowers, Russia and Ecuador are the only two recent examples of clear
nonperformance on the government's bonds, although what would happen to Mexico's dollar-
linked Tesobonos was a major question during the 1994-95 crisis.) Hence most of the emerging
market debt that has been the focus of attention in discussions of restructuring is in fact owed to
banks, and much of that is in the form of loans rather than securities.
One reason this matters is that banks, unlike many lenders in the bond market, can and
often do maintain ongoing relationships with particular borrowers. The heart of such
relationships is that some lenders have information —perhapsprivately disclosed data, perhaps
specialized knowledge of a country or its banks or its operating businesses, perhaps person-to-
person experience with the individuals responsible for the borrower's affairs —thatother lenders
do not. The enhanced information content of borrower-lender relationships in turn has value to
both sides. From the lender's perspective, more information means less risk. To the borrower,
the fact of being perceived by some lender as less risky means a lower cost of credit. In extreme—Fl—
cases it may mean the difference between having access to credit and finding none available at any
price.
Mother reason why the role of banks in lending to emerging market borrowers is
important is that banks normally face capital requirements. Loss of sufficient asset value can
therefore force a bank into a disadvantaged competitive position —forexample, having to stop
seeking new business, or being forced to raise new capital on unfavorable terms —andlarge
enough losses can even compromise a bank's viability as an independent institution. (The
sharpest counterexample is an open-end mutual thnd, where losses on holdings of securities mean
a lower quoted net asset value but typically trigger no direct consequences to the fi.ind itself)
It also matters in this context that much of the credit banks extend to emerging market
borrowers takes the form of loans rather than marketable securities. The market for such loans is
normally thin. When a borrower experiences difficulties, each lender will have its own assessment
of the probability of receiving payment and hence its own notion of what its asset is still worth.
The baths that maintain a special relationship with a particular borrower may well have a different
sense of the value of that borrower's obligations (either higher or lower) than do other lenders.
But there is no readily visible, consensus reference-value for the loan's worth comparable to that
given by the price of a bond traded in a highly liquid securities market.
Not Markin2 to Market. For reasons that derive in pan from precisely this absence of
thick and liquid markets for loan assets, banks do not mark their loan portfolios to market on
anything like a daily basis, Hence the decline in asset value consequent on a borrower's actual or
likely nonperformance does not immediately or automatically affect banks' balance sheets in a
way that would matter for their capital requirements (although risk-related capital requirements-12-
are typically greater for nonperforming loans). If nonperformance has merely become more likely
but a loanremains current, normally banks do notreflect this change in their balance sheets at all.
Even when a borrower has missed a payment, whether and how soon the lending banks will
reduce the stated value of its loan —andby how much —isin the first instance a matter of
internal judgment and, beyond that, subject to opinion from the regulators.4 But neither the
banks' internal valuation procedure nor that of bank regulators is likely to track closely the price
fluctuation that would take place in liquid security markets in a situation of anticipated or actual
borrower nonperformance.5
The fact that the lenders are banks and that banks do not immediately mark loans to
market (and, moreover, that knowing the market price is problematic anyway) produces one
straightforward reason why rescheduling or other formal restructuring can make a difference
when a borrower encounters difficulties: Restructuring enhances the lenders' control over the
value that they assign to a loan on their balance sheets. This control itself has value. Replacing-
anold loan with a new one, stretching out payment schedules, adjusting the interest rate and even
forgiving missed interest payments (or relegating them to "memo interest") are all ways of
maintaining the fiction —foraccounting purposes —thata loan is still an asset worth what it was
worth before, even though the appropriately risk-adjusted present value of the probable stream of
payments to flow from that asset may be diminished
Such accounting fictions have no direct bearing on the economic value of a lender's
business, but they do affect a lender's business if they affect its ability to meet its capital
requirements. The ability to maintain the fiction of no loss in value is therefore valuable. Hence
lenders have a reason to prefer formal restructuring to either default or mere nonperformance.-13-
And because restructuring has value to lenders but requires the agreement of both parties, lenders
in turn have an incentive to induce borrowers to want (or at least agree) to restructure their
problem obligations as well.
Multiple Debts Few borrowers have only one consolidated debt. Most, including most
borrowers in emerging markets, owe different amounts to different lenders or groups of lenders,
Often these debts are also of different form: some securities, some loans (of which some are
collateralized and some are not), some self-liquidating trade credit, and so on. Often the same
lenders participate in providing financing to the same borrower, or group of related borrowers, in
several different forms. A bank, for example, might own a country's sovereign bonds, extend
what amount to uncollateralized loans to the country's government or its banks, and also provide
trade credit to operating companies conducting import-export business there.
The multiplicity of debts would not matter if all of a borrower's obligations were strictly
independent of one another. In fact they are not. Cross-default and acceleration clauses give
lenders in one transaction the ability to demand ff111 and immediate payment if the borrower
defaults on an obligation resulting from a separate transaction. To the extent that borrowers
prefer not to have their other debts called —afterall, there was a reason to borrow the finds in
the first place —underthese arrangements borrowers therefore have a reason to prefer formal
restructuring to default. Borrowers may likewise have reason to prefer formal restructuring to
merely creating an event, such as a missed payment, that would qualify as default even if they
were conlident that the lender on that particular transaction would not declare a default. What
matters in this case is whether the lenders on the borrowers' other transactions would exercise the
right to demand payment of their claims6-14-
The fact of multiplicity of debts and multiplicity of lenders matters in yet further ways in
theemergingmarkets context because of the connection between a country's foreign borrowing,
which is the focus of discussion here, and what happens in its domestic credit markets. In the
case of sovereign credits, governments typically borrow both abroad and at home, sometimes via
the same securities. Hence nonperformance on obligations to foreign lenders can trigger a
collapse of the country's domestic credit market.7 Moreover, because nonperformance by
governments on foreign debt often leads to exchange controls that both block domestic residents'
capital mobility and impede debt service payments by private-sector borrowers, the most
immediate result is often capital flight —whichin turn either worsens the crisis or creates a crisis
if there was not one already.
OngoingNeeds.As is already implicit in the preceding discussion, most borrowers' debts
do not arise as one-time needs. Borrowers, including in particular borrowers in emerging
markets, have an ongoing need for new credit. At the most basic level, the financing needs of
either a single firm or an entire country plausibly increase in pace with the scale of economic
activity. Economic growth means increased demand for credit. For countries engaged in
international trade where transactions are executed in foreign currencies, some of that credit
normally comes from abroad. Moreover, because most trade credits are self-liquidating, even
financing a stagnant volume of import-export business requires a constant renewal of credit lines.
More generally, as was the case for the United States during much of the nineteenth century, most
developing countries rely on repeated inflows of foreign capital, over a period measured in
decades, to finance investment at rates in excess of their domestic saving.-15-
The question that then arises —andthis is the central focus of the argument in much of
the remainder of this paper —iswhether, in the event of difficulty in servicing some part of a
borrower's debt, restructuring that debt affects the borrower's subsequent ability to attract new
financing. The most obvious reason why restructuring versus default matters in this context is
that lenders may sensibly fear that a borrower that isn't performing on its obligations to other
lenders wouldn't perform on an obligation to them either. At the very best, new lenders would
see their claims met only on a pro rata basis along with those of previous lenders. Extending new
credit would amount to the new lenders' coming to the rescue of the existing lenders.8 Inmany
circumstances of debtor nonperformance, therefore, resolving the status of outstanding
obligations is key to attracting new financing even from a new set of lenders.
As a result, as long as lenders have reason to prefer restructuring over default or mere
inaction, borrowers have reason to do so as well. In effect, contract terms such as cross-default
and negative pledge clauses are a way for lenders to align borrowers' interests with their own. To
the extent that the lenders want to see a nonperforming loan restructured, these terms give the
borrowers a reason for seeking a restructuring also. (It is useflil to distinguish this line of
argument from that made above, based on borrowers' own incentive to maintain knowledge-
enhanced relationships with specific lenders. There, borrowers' incentive to restructure derives
from the possibility of obtaining further credit fromsame lenders. Here the incentive to
restructure arises from a potential desire to borrow from other lenders.)
In settings in which well-established bankruptcy procedures prevail, the need for new
credit is a well-recognized motivation for how such matters are normally handled. In the United
States, for example, a private creditor that has sought protection under the bankruptcy code can-16-
continue in operation by obtaining debtor-in-possession financing, which takes precedence over
pre-bankruptcy obligations. But the ability to do so follows only as a consequence of the
bankruptcy proceeding, and even then only with authorization from the court, which takes into
account (but need not accede to) objections raised by the existing creditors. Such procedures are
inoperative or unenforceable in many emerging market countries. Moreover, it is hard to see
what the analog to a formal bankruptcy proceeding (and hence to debtor-in-possession financing)
would be for sovereign borrowers.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge explicitly that borrowers' nonperformance often
takes on a further, inherently political dimension in the context of debts owed by emerging market
borrowers to foreign lenders. Given the importance of trade to most countries' economic
existence, maintaining orderly international financial relationships has become recognized almost
everywhere as a major element of government responsibility, comparable to (albeit not quite on a
par with) maintaining public safety, national security, and so on. Hence any situation that
threatens a country's ability to obtain ordinary trade credit, for example, is necessarily not just an
economic crisis but a political crisis as well, regardless of whether the initial problem has arisen
from the government's debts or those of private borrowers. Governments of emerging market
countries facing such a crisis therefore have a political incentive to put it behind them, and
normalizing relationships with foreign creditors is a key part of doing so. Hence borrowers facing
difficulty in servicing their debts have all the more reason to agree to a restructuring if that is what
the lenders seek.-17-
3.How Easy Should Restructuring Be?
One of the great paradoxes of banking is that repudiating one's debts makes a borrower
more creditworthy. The standard explanation is that as long as the borrower has some remaining
assets, or even just some prospect of a stream of future income, under the usual me-first rules the
bottom tranche of debt is always the least risky. Getting rid of all existing debts gives some new
creditor the opportunity to hold what will amount to the first tranche. (The analogy to debtor-in-
possession financing, and hence the value of establishing workable bankruptcy standards where
this can be done, should be self-evident.)
Examples of the working of this paradox are not hard to find. In the United States the
surest way for an individual to find his or her mailbox overflowing with new credit card offers is
to declare personal bankruptcy. In a context closer to the focus of this discussion, global
investors in the early 1 990s raced to buy bonds issued by sovereign credits that had just written
down the principal on their outstanding debt under the Brady Plan. One of the chief motivations
underlying the current proposal for organized forgiveness of the debts of the world's fifty or so
poorest countries is the hope that once the existing debt is expunged, lenders will promptly extend
new credit.
What makes this behavior paradoxical is the common-sense notion that actions follow a
pattern, and so reputation matters. If a borrower has defaulted before, why not again? The
answer —atleast in principle —isthat abandoning debts enhances a debtor's creditworthiness
only in circumstances that preclude repetition and therefore circumstances that nullify the adverse
reputation effect. In the United States personal (as opposed to corporate) bankruptcy is
permitted at most once every seven years.9 Lenders had reason to assume that countries that had-18-
restructuredtheir debts under the Brady Plan would not seek another such restructuring any time
soon. (The Brady Plan also enabled sovereign credits to put up what amounted to collateral by
using US. Treasury debt, placed in escrow accounts, to secure the principal and near-term
interest payments on what then became bonds.) The current call for debt forgiveness for
extremely low-income countries similarly assumes that there will be no repetition of this action
within theforeseeablefuture.
What all of these examples have in common is that by participating in a formal debt
restructuring, borrowers in effect reduce the value of what they owe but do so in an orderly way,
through procedures that, at least in principle —apartfrom armtwistingby the regulators —have
the consent of their creditors.'° Hence the borrower acquires a reputation for not servicing debts
as promised but also, importantly, a reputation for participating in an orderly resolution of the
resulting problem. And, as the discussion above makes clear, lenders have reason to value
resolving nonperformance problems in this way.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that once debt service difficulties arise, a borrower's
ability to obtain new financing —includingmerely the renewal of trade credits —dependsin part
on debt restructuring. The contrast between the ample flow of new money to developing
countries under the Brady Plan (which involved both write-down of principal and below-market
interest rates, albeit not necessarily both on the same obligations) and the much different
experience under the Baker Plan (which mostly involved rescheduling of principal payments) is
one example. Mother is the contrast between the rapid economic recovery in Mexico after the
recession associated with the 1994-95 debt crisis (which involved debt restructuring supported by
IMFandU.S. government credits) and Mexico's much slower recovery from the 1982 crisis-19-
(which led to the Baker Plan). Yet another example is the contrast between the rapidrecovery
now in progress in Korea (which after a crisis in 1997 restructured its large short-term debt,
mostly owed by banks at least nominally in the private sector, into government-guaranteed bank
credits and then a Eurobond financing) and the sluggish growth in Brazil for someyears after that
country attempted in 1987 to declare a unilateral debt-payments moratorium. A far more extreme
case in point is North Korea, which defaulted on two major loans more than twenty years ago, has
since been unable to receive credit from most market sources, and has suffered one of the world's
worst economic performances throughout much of this period.
Given that in many situations of nonperformance both borrowers and lenders have a clear
interest in rescheduling the problem debt, what seems at first thought much more surprising is that
restructuring is not easier to accomplish. The point is especially relevant as securities have come
to provide an increasing share of emerging market credits. Bonds issued under New York law
require unanimous consent of the holders to amend any of the terms of payment, including the
interest rate and the schedule for repayment of principal. The sheer mechanics of notiing
hundreds or even thousands of bond holders and obtaining consent from each are daunting
enough (and all the more so if the bonds are issued in bearer form), but the unanimous consent
requirement also creates an obvious incentive for some lenders to game against the others by
withholding their consent. Moreover, New York bond contracts typically include no procedure
for establishing collective representation of the holders, so that it is difficult to determine how to
go about structuring a proposal with at least some claim of procedural legitimacy to present to
holders for their consent.1' Bond contracts also typically do not include the equal sharing clauses
conventionally used in bank loan contracts to help maintain a united position among the lenders-20-
and especially to discourage dissident members of the lender group from initiating litigation on
their own)2
Although these specific contract features make bonds significantly harder to restructure
than bath loans, loans as well are not always easy to reschedule or otherwise amend. In the case
of loans advanced by large syndicates, banks with only a small participation, which poses no
threat to their essential business prospects, have less interest in maintaining the no-loss-of-value
fiction. When restructuring involves commitment of new money, these banks often prefer simply
to write off their loss and drop out. When a borrower owes money to banks in different countries
as was the case, for example, in the 1997-98 Korean crisis —thefact that lenders in different
countries face differing regulation and also differing conditions in their respective home
economies can be a significant stumbling block. In the Korean example a key part of the story,
which was clear at the time, was that the G-10 central banks were pressuring their countries'
commercial banks to agree on a restructuring plan that would prevent a situation of broad-scale
default.13 What would have happened if market forces had been left to function on their own
remains (and will remain) an unanswered question.
The contrast between the readily identifiable interest that both borrowers and lenders often
have in achieving a restructuring and the prevalence of these systematic impediments to doing so
provides the motivation for much of the interest shown in international debt resolution
mechanisms during the past few years. At the grand conceptual level, economists and others have
offered various proposals for a "new financial architecture," typically centered around the creation
of either an international bankruptcy mechanism or an international lender of last resort, or both.'4
At the level of everyday financial practice, bankers have become more adept at handling London-2k
Club negotiations, the bondholder community has begun to makeprogress in addressing its more
complicated representation issue, sovereign borrowers such as Pakistan and Ukraine have shown
how to use exchange offers to overcome the impediment posed by the unanimous consent
requirement, and other as-yet-untried ideas such as exit consents are receiving widespread
attention, Yet all these proposals and actual innovations notwithstanding, debt restructuring in the
international arena remains far from easy or straightforward.
Perhaps there is a reason why this is so. As is well known, the conflicting incentives of
borrowers and lenders and the asymmetry of information that a borrower and its lenders have
about the borrower's financial condition and prospects create a classic moral hazard situation, and
hence the need for mechanisms to commit borrowers to meet their obligation. The need for such
mechanisms is all the greater when the absence of strong auditing and accounting practices and
other forms of transparency make a borrower's condition and prospects especially difficult for
outsiders to monitor —asis often the case in emerging markets. Transaction by transaction,
therefore, lenders always seek ways of committing borrowers to pay what they owe.
But from a perspective that is broader than just one transaction at a time, it is also useful
to lenders to have mechanisms that commit themselves to press the borrower for payment and
even to exercise their rights under whatever mechanisms are in place should the borrower fail to
perform. Lenders (and, as developed in the discussion below, borrowers too) have an interest
that extends over time to fbture transactions. That continuing interest may sometimes conflict
with a lender's interest in simply gaining the greatest value, net of fully allocated expense, from
any one transaction. None of this is surprising, and in principle lenders should be able to balance
these current and future interests in a purely discretionary way. But there are countless examples-22-
ofsituations in which just this kind of balancing of current versus ongoing interests is difficult —
insome situations it is impossible —withoutsome form of commitment mechanism to preclude
taking actions that would be optimal on a case-by-case basis yet harmfi.il from a more forward-
looking perspective.'5
In the specific setting of what to do when borrowers fail to meet their obligations, the
obvious conflict rises from the inferences that ft,ture borrowers, including but not limited to those
having difficulties at the moment, draw about the likely consequences of their own subsequent
nonperformance. As introductory banking textbooks explain, this is why it sometimes makes
sense for a lender to pay more to collect a debt, or to seize and liquidate collateral, than the
proceeds are worth. The negative net proceeds of such an action are, in effect, an investment in
gaining performance by future borrowers. To repeat: that investment is especially valuable in
circumstances where verifying the borrower's condition is problematic. Systematic impediments
to debt restructuring represent a mechanism that constrains a lender to be more likely to make
that investment.
The fact that loans often have multiple lenders compounds the problem. In addition to the
inherent conflict that exists between a single lender's interest in the transaction at hand and in the
environment in which future transactions will take place, there is also then a potential conflict
among the interests of different lenders. Hence lenders, including those that are already creditors
to any particular nonperforming borrower as well as those that are not, face a collective-action
problem. Equal sharing clauses (in bank loan contracts) and unanimous consent requirements (in
bond contracts) act as mechanisms for solving that collective-action problem among the lenders
already participating in a nonperforming credit Both serve to constrain the lendersa group-23-
fromacting in any one transaction in ways that may dilute borrowers' incentive to perform on
future debts. (As the discussion below makes clear, it is of course possible for such constraints to
be too tight.) Cross-default and negative pledge clauses act as a mechanism for solving the
analogous collective action problem among lenders more broadly, including those that are part of
the specific credit in question and those that are not. More generally, conditioning private credits
on a country's receiving TMFloans,or even on its merely entering into an IMF agreement, is also
a means of solving lenders' collective action problem. In such circumstances the IMF in effect
serves as a cartel coordinator for the lenders.
Hence impediments to debt restructuring have their purpose too. But the straightforward
implication of this line of argument is that not all nonperforming debts should be restructured,
even when it is in the interest of the borrower and also in the (narrowly construed) interest of the
lenders to do so. Because the practical alternative to restructuring is hard to specif,', whether this
means more outright defaults or merely more instances of "muddling on" with debts
nonperforming but not in default is ambiguous. But it does mean that failure to restructure a
nonperforming debt is not necessarily a failure. Md given the role that restructuring normally
plays in facilitating the extension of new credit to a nonperforming borrower, it also means that
some new loans will probably not be granted. Indeed, the deeper implication is that in a regime in
which restructuring is systematically not so "easy," some old credits would not have been
extended in the first place.-24-
4.Real Counterparts of FinancialFlows and Accountin2Losses
The place to start in assessing whether a regime in which some specific loans are not made
is good or bad is to recall that the purpose of credit flows is normally to thnd some kind of real
economic activity. Hence debt problems, when they occur, are not merely a financial
phenomenon. For every financial loss not fully offset by somebody else's gain, there is
somewhere a real economic loss. Since the flndamental rationale for having competitive financial
markets to begin with is to support the production and use of real goods and services, what it
means to do without any given debt transaction is ultimately a matter of real, rather than financial,
outcomes.
Thinking about nonperforming debt problems in this way leads to what can sometimes be
an awkward question: When things go sour, where did the money go? In cases of ordinary
business debt problems, the answer is sometimes straightforward and sometimes not, but rarely
interesting in a general way: a firm's product market is unexpectedly weak, its labor or its
suppliers become unexpectedly expensive, its production is disappointingly inefficient, its
competitors are surprisingly strong, its new technology fails, and so on. Life in a competitive
market economy is Ibil of idiosyncratic reverses. But the focus of interest here, spurred by the
problems suffered by one emerging market country after another in just the past few years, is not
isolated business failure. The issue is instead systemic debt problems that affect a country's
borrowers more generally, often to an extent that ultimately threatens the government's own
credit as well. Hence asking where the money went is more interesting, but also more difficult.
An example from outside the emerging markets context can perhaps best illustrate the
point. The collapse of the savings and loan (S&L) industry in the United States in the late 1980s-25-
resultedin a direct cost to U.S.taxpayers of$126billion.'6 Thisloss was not just a financial
phenomenon.Much of it represented the dissipation of the American economy's resources in
constructing office buildings, energy extraction facilities and other tangible investments thatin the
end the market did not value. Much ofthe restrepresented thetransfer of resources to corrupt
andself-dealing S&Loperators,some ofwhom ultimatelyfacedcriminalsanctions.In retrospect,
itwould clearlyhave beenbetter ifmanyof the credits that led to the U.S.S&Ls' demise had
never been extended in the first place.
Turningthento the case at hand,wheredid the moneygoin Korea? InIndonesia?In
Thailand?InBrazil? Theanswerismorecomplexin thesecases, not least because ofthe roleof
changing currency valuations inwhat wentwrong.Projects that may have looked economically
viableatone exchange rate no longerdidat another.Buteven this plain fact is properly part of
thestory,notan excuse for ducking the issue, and itopensinturnyetfbrther questions:Why
were countries' exchange ratessupported where they initiallywere? Given the well-known role
of capital flight in initiatingmostcountries'currency crises (notjust in this latest roundbutmore
generally),wereexchangerate policies athinlydisguised mechanismfor effecting what amounted
totransfer payments? Whoultimately borethe riskarisingfrom the use ofunhedgedforeign
currency obligations to finance investments, the viabilityofwhichdependedon stable or
appreciating currencyvalues? Andhowdid the allocation of that risk-bearing correspond to
claimsonthe potential returns from those investmentsin theevent that currencyvalueshad
remainedstable or appreciated?
Norare currency fluctuations the entirematter. Whethertheinvestments being financed
bythese loansmadesense on othergroundsis surely no less of a question in these countries than-26-
it should have been in the case of the 1 980s office-construction spree in the United States.
Indeed, the government-business ties and lack of transparency that have received so much
discussion ever since the Asian crisis began (with the Thai currency crisis) in 1997 suggest that
the economic viability of such investments in many emerging market countries may be even more
subject to question than in the industrial world. Either way, however, the questions at issue are
about real uses of an economy's resources —importantly,resources that could have been
deployed for other purposes —notmerely about financial losses. Moreover, leaving aside what
led to the financial losses and real resource costs behind the 1997-99 crisis, questions like these
are pertinent to future resource uses, and hence future debt transactions, as well.
Thinking about the matter in this way makes clear that simply maximizing the flow of
credit to any borrower or group of borrowers, whether in an emerging market country or not, is
what competitive financial markets exist to do. The economic function of these markets is to
transfer resources from ultimate savers to ultimate investors, but not irrespective of the real
economic use of the resources that the ultimate investors intend, and certainly not irrespective of
the alternative intended use between one would-be ultimate investor and another. The role of
competitive financial markets is to discriminate in just this way. Transaction by transaction,
lenders do this every day.
But there is also a systemic aspect of this process that arises from the underlying
presumptions that both borrowers and lenders carry into their transaction-by-transaction dealings.
These include presumptions about whether and under what circumstances borrowers really are
supposed to meet their obligations, and what course lenders will take when they don't. To the
extent that any competitive situation has elements of a zero-sum game, borrowers and lenders-27-
would each naturally prefer that these presumptions be different —morein their own favor, and
less to the other side's. Because financial markets make possible real economic activity that could
not otherwise take place, however, dealings between borrowers and lenders are not merely zero-
sum. Some ways of handling a specific transaction make both parties better off Similarly, some
sets of underlying presumptions make both parties better off over time.
The heart of the argument about debt restructuring advanced here is that underlying
presumptions that potentially make both borrowers and lenders better off on an ongoing basis are
sometimes in conflict with the actions that are potentially to their mutual advantage when any one
transaction is viewed in isolation. Creating mechanisms that preserve or even enhance those
presumptions, even at the cost of foregoing mutually beneficial actions in some specific
transactions, is therefore potentially valuable. Impediments to debt restructuring constitute such a
mechanism. That these impediments sometimes impose costs in the context of specific
nonperforming debts that are not restructured, and that those costs are sometimes borne by both
borrowers and lenders, is certainly true. That as a result some credits are not extended in the first
place is not only true, it is precisely thepoint. Itiswhatmakes lenders —and,on reflection,
borrowers too —betteroff.
All this is not to say that restructuring nonperforming debts should be either impossible or
maximally difficult. Even the soundest risks, as seen ex ante, sometimes turn out badly ex post.
(If not, they wouldn't be true risks.) Borrowers do meet with adverse circumstances that they
could not have foreseen, or that genuinely seemed improbable. Events happen that are beyond
their control. Some borrowers that can't pay on time will be able to pay later. The point is not
that restructuring should be as difficult as possible, but rather that it should not be as easy as-28-
possible —arguably,not so easy as is currently the case. The losses sustained by lenders when
debts default, and the real costs suffered by borrowers when they cannot obtain new credit, are
bad per se. They are worth accepting only as part of a regime governing borrower-lender
dealings that justifies itself over time by effectively fostering economic production and economic
development. But that regime is not one in which all nonperforming debts are always
restructured.
A useful analogy, again from a different context, is the classic prescription for lender-of-
last-resort actions in the face of a systemic bank run —namely,to lend on good credit to solvent
institutions.'7 This simple maxim rests on the presumption that individual banks are responsible
for their solvency (picking good credits is what banks are supposed to do) but not for their
liquidity when the banking system as a whole is impaired (maintaining liquid liabilities against
illiquid assets is also what banks are supposed to do). A strict prohibition against lender-of-last-
resort actions would prevent a central bank from rescuing banks that are threatened not only for
reasons not of their own making but, indeed, for reasons that arise as a consequence of carrying
out their economic function as intended. Under such a regime banks would be unable to provide
liquidity transformation. But a regime of always rescuing every bank not only destroys banks'
incentive to serve their function of allocating resources to good credits. Because of the
interaction of limited liability and the competitive market in which banks raise their own capital,
such a regime discourages them from serving this function.
The bank-run analogy is not fully apt here for several reasons. Especially in the context of
nonperforming borrowers in emerging markets, sorting out insolvency from illiquidity is not
straightforward. For sovereign credits, apart from truly extreme cases it is not clear what-29-
insolvencywould mean. The familiar chain of borrowing, in which a country's banks act as
conduits for channeling foreign-source credit to the country's operating companies, while the
government often in effect acts as a similar conduit (or provides implicit guarantees) for the
banks, further compounds the problem. But the basic idea remains valid nonetheless: What to do
when a borrower fails to perform on its obligations is a matter of information, inference, and
judgment. A regime in which restructuring is either impossibly difficult or routinely easy prevents
that process from working.
5.Concluding Thoughts: Restructuring Without Rules,andthe Role of Official
Lending
Thereis no need to restate here the main conclusions of this line of thinking, which are
already summarized at the beginning of the paper. Instead, two final considerations particular to
the context of emerging markets are worth noting. First, in the legal setting of many emerging
market countries, lenders themselves have to assume a broader range of responsibilities. For
purposes of comparison, in a standard corporate bankruptcy proceeding in the United States, the
lenders propose changes in debt terms, in the borrower's corporate structure and in other aspects
of the borrower's business, and the borrower either agrees or faces liquidation. But these
negotiations take place within the framework of rules that specif' majority voting within each
class of credits, "cramdown" conditions under which one class of creditors can force another to
go along, and ultimately the threat of liquidation —allwith a judge to determine whether the
relevant tests have been met. Any proposed changes in the borrower's corporate structure
likewise stand against the background of the U.S. laws applicable to corporate governance. By-30-
contrast,when bankruptcy and corporate governance institutions are inadequate, or when lenders
either can't or simply don't force their use, lenders potentially negotiate with borrowers over a
much broader range of issues and in a more free-form way.
The point is relevant because some of the debtor nonperformance in the Asian crisis
appeared to reflect problems of financial and corporate structure as much as or more than
underlying business risk. Any firm is necessarily subject to some volatility in its cash flows, and
some finns far more so than others. Some firms' cash flows are also exposed to volatility from
foreign currency fluctuations, some to volatility from fluctuations in the price of some particular
raw commodity, and so 0) A balance sheet that is entirely appropriate for one firm may
therefore be highly inappropriate for others. The purpose of any firm's borrowing is to facilitate
its nonfinancial operations, but the wrong balance sheet structure can instead place the firm's
nonfinancial operations, and potentially the firm itself, at undue risk.
This is the point at which debt restructuring comes into contact with more general balance
sheet restructuring, and ultimately with corporate restructuring in the broader sense of combining,
separating, or even terminating existing business operations. To a far greater extent than in the
industrial world, in the emerging markets context all this is in the province of firms' creditors. It
is so because denying new financing is often the only potential sanction capable of effecting
change.
Second, unlike most private borrowers, governments in emerging markets have another
source of credit to which they can turn: other governments on a bilateral basis, as well as the IIMF
and the World Bank. Hence official lending potentially plays a key role in questions of sovereign
credit debt restructuring. Because the borrowing governments in these cases are often conduits-3k
fortheir countries' private-sector borrowers, however, official lending is also in effect available
more broadly
Therole of official lending complicates the argument advanced in this paper in several
ways. As much recent discussion has emphasized, the potential availability of official lending can
reduce the disincentives for borrowers to fail to meet their obligations At the same time, official
lenders normally exhibit even greater commitment to the no-loss-in-value fiction than do banks,
and far more so than among bond investors. (Another way to put this point is in terms of the
fiction that lending and direct assistance are conceptually distinct.) The same argument developed
above, to the effect that lenders' reluctance to recognize loss of value is a factor empowering
borrowers, applies here as well It is therefore somewhat surprising that the possibility of official
lenders' recording losses —includinglosses on loans by the IMF and the World Bank —hasnot
bulked larger in discussions of the many issues that the latest emerging markets crisis has raised.
But it is important to recognize that the availability of credit from the IMF and other official
lenders is certainly not the only source of moral hazard in emerging market debt transactions, and
the argument advanced in this paper implies that it is not even the most ftindamental source.
The central focus of the argument presented here is instead debt restructuring entered into
by emerging market borrowers and their private-sector lenders No one should doubt that, in cases
of actual or threatened nonperformance, restructuring helps to restore the orderly flow of new
credit. Nor should anyone doubt that, on a transaction-by-transaction basis, doing so not only
avoids losses to lenders but also prevents a wide range of real economic costs to nonperforming
borrowers. What makes the question of debt restructuring more subtle is that the presumptions
that underlie debt transactions more generally also depend on restructuring practices. A world in-32-
which nonperformingdebts are not easily and automaticallyrestructuredis therefore a world in
whichsome creditswillnot be extended. Butthatmay wellbeto the benefit of not only the
lenders but borrowers as well.-33-
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Endnotes
For example,althoughCuba has long since repudiated all debts of the pre-Castro regime, in 1979
the People's Republic of China settled with the U.S. Government on claims against pre-1949
Nationalist China, and Russia recently even settled with holders of pre-1917 Tsarist bonds.
2Fora general discussion of moral hazard in this context, see Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). See
also Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Ch.6, and the many references cited there.
See deLong (1999) for a useflul historical review.
In the United States, for example, the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation render an interagency judgment when they deem
that assets are "value impaired"
The fact that banks can set aside a reserve against prospective decline in the value of loan assets
complicates this story somewhat but.represents no fundamental change. The reserve is a counter-
asset against the loan, reducing the net (loan minus reserve) value on the asset side of the bank's
balance sheet. Reserving against a loan therefore reduces the bank's stated equity just as if the
bank had written down the value of the loan itself For purposes that matter to this discussion,
the two are equivalent.
6Itis useful to distinguish this reason for borrowers to seek debt restructuring from the reason
given above for lenders to do so. The lenders' reason for preferring restructuring to default
grows out of forces external to the direct borrower-lender relationship: specifically, the capital
requirements and accounting practices that are a part of the relationship between lenders and their
regulators. By contrast, the borrowers' reason for preferring restructuring to default or mere
nonpayment grows directly out of an aspect of the borrower-lender relationship, albeit a
relationship between the borrower and its lenders other than those on whose claim the borrower is
not performing.
During the 1994-95 Mexican crisis, for example, many Tesobono holders were domiciled in
Mexico. Default would almost certainly have made it impossible for the government to borrow
from domestic Mexican lenders, and probably would have shut down the country's credit markets
more generally.
A problematic aspect of credit arrangements under such circumstances is the inability of lenders
to enforce agreements that would give their uncollateralized claims priority over similarly
uncollateralized but subsequently contracted obligations. One possibility would be to rely on
negative pledge clauses precluding such subsequent agreements, perhaps enforced by using non-
exclusive jurisdiction clauses (when lenders are in different countries) to enable unsatisfied lenders
to pursue their claims from other lenders whose claims are honored when theirs aren't; but this
concept apparently remains a theory untried in actual legal practice.-36-
An interestingempirical questionis whether individuals who have gone bankrupt find their
ability to gain credit beginning to erode again after, say, five or six years.
10Evena pure rescheduling, with interest and other terms left unchanged, would normally be
priced by the market as a decline in value.
By contrast, bonds issued under U.K. law usually include provisions for convening a
bondholder assembly as well as provisions for majority voting.
12SeeBuchheit (1 998a, 1 998b, I 998c) for a detailed discussion of sharing clauses, majority
action clauses and collective representation clauses. See also Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and
Eichengreen and Mody (2000).
13Seethe account of the Korean restructuring in Euromoney, March, 1998, pp. 32-37.
14Prominentexamples include Eichengreen (1999), Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren (1998),
Goldstein (1998), Rogoff (1999) and Council on Foreign Relations (1999).
15Theclassic formulation of the time inconsistency problem in economics is that of Kydland and
Prescott (1977). Non-standard applications in the context of a single country's monetary policy
are given by Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff(1985). See Dooley (2000) for an application
to debt problems that formalizes parts of the discussion here.
16Thissum included $42 billion in costs that the government reimbursed to the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation before putting that entity out of business, $79 billion in costs
(net-of-liquidation proceeds) borne by the Resolution Trust Corporation, and $6 billion in
contractual tax benefits awarded to private acquirers of failed S&Ls.
17SeeBagehot (1873).
Currency depreciation may also trigger a breach of loan covenants even before any effect on
cash flow has appeared.